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1. Introduction 
 
Failure occurs when one or more of the intended functions of a product are no longer 
fulfilled to the customer’s satisfaction.  The most critical product failures are those that 
escape design reviews and in-house quality inspection and are found by the customer.   
The product may work for a while until its performance degrades to an unacceptable level 
or it may have not worked even before customer took possession of the product.  The end 
results of failures which may lead to unsafe conditions or major losses of the main 
function are rated high in severity. 
 
• Traditional FMEA 
   Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a tool widely used in the automotive, 
aerospace, and electronics industries to identify, prioritize, and eliminate known 
potential failures, problems, and errors from systems under design, before the product 
is released (Stamatis, 1997).   Several industrial FMEA standards such as those 
published by the Society of Automotive Engineers, US Department of Defense, and 
the Automotive Industry Action Group employ the Risk Priority Number (RPN) to 
measure risk and severity of failures.  The Risk Priority Number (RPN) is a product 
of 3 indices: Occurrence (O), Severity (S), and Detection (D).  In a traditional FMEA 
process design engineers typically analyze the “root cause” and “end-effects” of 
potential failures in a sub-system or component and assign penalty points through the 
O, S, D values to each failure.  The analysis is organized around categories called 
failure modes, which link the causes and effects of failures. 
 A few actions are taken upon completing the FMEA worksheet. The RPN column 
generally will identify the high-risk areas.  The idea of performing FMEA is to 
eliminate or reduce known and potential failures before they reach the customers. 
Thus, a plan of action must be in place for the next task.  Not all failures can be 
resolved during the product development cycle, thus prioritization of actions must be 
made within the design group. 
 
• Limitations of traditional FMEA 
  One definition of detection difficulty (D) is how well the organization controls the 
development process.  Another definition relates to the detectability of a particular 
failure in the product when it is in the hands of the customer.  The former asks “What 
is the chance of catching the problem before we give it to the customer?”  The latter 
asks “What is the chance of the customer catching the problem before the problem 
results in a catastrophic failure?” (Palady, 1995)  These differing definitions confuse 
the FMEA users when one tries to determine detection difficulty.   Are we trying to 
measure how easy it is to detect where a failure has occurred or when it has occurred?  
Or are we trying to measure how easy or difficult it is to prevent failures?   
   Ordinal scale variables are used to rank-order industries such as, hotels, 
restaurants, and movies (Note that a 4 star hotel is not necessarily twice as good as a 2 
star hotel).  Ordinal values preserve rank in a group of items, but the distance between 
the values cannot be measured since a distance function does not exist.  Thus, the 
product or sum of ordinal variables loses its rank since each parameter has different 
scales. The RPN is a product of 3 independent ordinal variables, it can indicate that 
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some failure types are “worse” than others, but give no quantitative indication of their 
relative effects.   
 
• Cost as a measure of failure 
   To resolve the ambiguity of measuring detection difficulty and the irrational logic of 
multiplying 3 ordinal indices, a new methodology was created to overcome these 
shortcomings, Life Cost-Based FMEA.  Life Cost-Based FMEA measures failure/risk 
in terms of monetary cost.  Cost is a universal parameter that can be easily related to 
severity by engineers and others.  Thus, failure cost can be estimated using the 
following simplest form: 
 
              ∑
=
=
n
i
iicp
1
Cost Failure Expected                                                                     (1)  
 
                     p: Probability of a particular failure occurring 
         c: Monetary cost associated with that particular failure 
        n: Total number of failure scenarios 
 
• Formation of team  
   FMEA is most effective when there are inputs into it from all concerned disciplines 
of the product development team.  However, FMEA is a long process and can become 
tedious and won’t be effective if too many people participate.  An ideal team should 
have 3 to 4 people from: design, manufacturing, and service departments if possible.  
Depending on how complex the system is, the entire process can take anywhere from 
one to four weeks working full time.  Thus, it is important to agree to the time 
commitment before starting the analysis else, anxious managers might stop the 
procedure before it is completed. 
 
2. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is used to assist in identifying potential 
failure modes early in the process of design.  Traditional FMEA measures risk using the 
Risk Priority Number (RPN).  The FMEA worksheet consists of a table that will be filled 
in by the FMEA team; it lists the causes and effects of potential failure modes which are 
known by the team of engineers.  These failure modes are organized around functions or 
the “Voice of the Customer” (VOC) (see Table 1).  The following section describes the 
elements of the spreadsheet used for listing identified failure scenarios in a device. 
 
Table 1 Components of a FMEA Worksheet 
         
Function or 
Requirement
Potential Failure 
Modes Causes of Failure Root Cause Effect of Failure
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Target Completion 
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2.1. Function  
Function is the specific behavior (e.g., hold vacuum) intended by the designers. Use 
the functional analysis to list major sub-functions or use customer requirements 
(Voice Of the Customers= VOC) in this column.  Discrepancies from the intended 
function or requirement are the result of a failure in the system. We recommend 
organizing the FMEA worksheet first by listing the functions of the device in the 
leftmost column.   
2.2. Potential Failure Mode  
It describes the departure from the intended function or requirement. For function-
based FMEA, interpret failure modes as a sub-function occurring improperly or not at 
all.  Potential failure modes can be considered in any of the following four categories: 
1. No Function: There is a complete absence of the intended function. 
2. Partial/degraded function: The item does not meet some of the required 
functions 
3. Intermittent function: The item performs a function intermittently. 
4. Unintended function: Another function (behavior) is performed which was 
unintended in the original design.   
It is important to note that even if certain failures have never occurred for a similar 
device, it should be listed on the FMEA worksheet if the failure is physically 
possible. 
2.3. Cause of Failure  
It describes why the desired requirement fails. Consider the needed conditions for 
each customer requirement. Also, ask yourself “what has to happen for the function to 
occur properly?” Then, list the possible causes of failure due to components’ 
behaviors, usage conditions (especially regarding human interaction), operating 
environment, and interfaces with other systems.  
2.4. Root Cause of Failure  
To find the root cause of failure may, in many cases require detailed analysis of the 
failure mode. You may need to identify root causes by using by other techniques such 
as “Five Why’s” (ask why succeeding failures happen five times until a root cause is 
determined) or the Ishikawa Fishbone Root Cause Analysis (organize root causes 
around man, machine, material, method, measurement, environment) (Ishikawa, 
1985).   
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2.5. Effect of Failure  
Effect of a failure on product, user, or other systems is the noticeable effect on 
performance, safety, and perceived quality.  As a designer, this is the effect you are 
trying to prevent in your own design. The root cause is where you will make changes 
in your existing designs as will be discussed later in section 2.10. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Failure Scenarios 
Figure 1 shows an example of a cause-and-effect chain of events.  There are many 
such “failure scenarios” or “event chains” possible in an FMEA and you should list 
each on a separate row with an associated RPN.  It should be noted that failures can 
have many causes, and each scenario should be listed on a separate line on the FMEA 
worksheet.   
 
2.6. Probability of Occurrence (O)  
Occurrence is defined as how frequently the specific failure cause is projected to 
occur and result in the “failure mode”.  The literature prescribes that Occurrence is 
assigned to the cause (and failure mode) and has nothing to do with the probability of 
the end effects.  However, we recommend associating the Occurrence rating with the 
entire failure scenario, since some causes could have many different effects. 
Occurrence should refer to the probability of cause → a particular failure mode → a 
particular effect/event.  In mathematical terms:  
 
Probability of failure = (Probability of cause) × (Probability of failure given the cause)      (2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Undetected
Poor field
Ground Short Insulation
Thermal damage
not(Generate
Magnetic field)
Main function
Potential
Failure mode Cause of Failure Root Cause
Turn to turn
Short
Insulation
Thermal damage
Degrad
field
No magnet
field
Effect of Failure
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Table 2 Example of Occurrence criteria [AIAG, 1995] 
 
 
Occurrence scores are generated on the basis of an industry- or company-specific 
mapping from probabilities to a 1-10 scale (see Table 2).   
2.7. Severity of effect (S)  
Severity is typically defined as an assessment of the seriousness of the potential “end 
effects,” and is assessed independent of the causes.  However, we recommend 
assessing Severity to the entire failure scenario (causes, failure modes effects).  
Severity is estimated on a 1 to 10 scale (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3 Severity of effect scores [AIAG, 1995] 
 
Effect Severity of Effect Severity 
Ranking 
Hazardous without warning when a failure mode affects safe device operation without warning 10 
Hazardous with warning when a failure mode affects safe device operation with warning 9 
very high device inoperable: loss of primary function 8 
High device operable: at a highly reduced level of performance 7 
Moderate device operable: at a reduced level of performance 6 
Low device operable: at a slightly reduced level of performance 5 
very low device operable: defect noticed by most customers 4 
Minor device operable: defect noticed by average customers 3 
very minor device operable: defect noticed by discriminating customers 2 
None almost no effect 1 
 
 
2.8. Detection difficulty (D),  
Detection, sometimes called detectability, has no standard definition.  There is some 
confusion surrounding this index, since different definitions exist for this term.  If the 
team does not have a good understanding of this index, we recommend using a value 
of “1” for all fields and the team can fill it in later if time permits.  The most common 
interpretation of detection is an assessment of the ability of the “design controls” to 
identify a potential cause or design weakness before the component, subsystem or 
system is released for production.  Detection scores are generated on the basis of 
Probability of Failure   Probability of Failure  Occurrence   
Ranking   
Very High:  Failure is almost inevitable   ≥ 1 in 2 10   
  1 in 3 9   
High:  Repeated failures   1 in 8 8   
  1 in 20 7   
Moderate:  Occasional failures   1 in 80 6   
  1 in 400 5   
  1 in 2,000 4   
Low:  Relatively few failures   1 in 15,000 3   
  1 in 150,000 2   
Remote:  Failure is unlikely  1 in 1,500,000 1   
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likelihood of detection by the relevant company design review and testing procedures 
program (see Table 4).   Column A reflects the chance of catching a failure before it 
goes to the customers. Column B reflects the organization’s controls, systems and 
maturity level of its quality and reliability programs. 
Table 4. Detection criteria [Palady, 1995] 
       
Detection Difficulty Criteria Rating
Impossible to detect No known techniques available 10
Remote detection Only unproven or unreliable technique available 9
Very slight detection Proving durability tests on products with system components installed 8
Slight detection Tests on product with prototypes with system components installed 7
Low detection Tests on similar system components 6
Medium detection Tests on preproduction system components 5
Moderate detection Tests on early prototype system elements 4
Good detection Simulation and modeling in early stage 3
High chance of detection Proven computer analysis available in early design stage 2
Certain to detect Proven detection methods available in concept stage 1
 
Occurrence, Severity, and Detection ratings can be customized to the user’s needs and 
type of industry. 
2.9. Risk Priority Number (RPN) 
  We define the Risk Priority Number (RPN) as follows: 
  RPN =   (Occurrence) × (Severity) × (Detection)           (3) 
Larger RPNs indicate the need for corrective action or failure resolution.  Give 
special attention to the effect and its causes when the severity rating is high regardless 
of the RPN.  You should construct a Pareto chart (Crosby, 1969) of RPNs vs. causes 
or failure modes to clearly summarize the FMEA.  Note that each discrete failure 
scenario (i.e. mode, cause, and effect) should have its own associated Occurrence, 
Severity and Detection values, and therefore a distinct RPN number.   
2.10. Actions  
Actions Recommended to Reduce RPN (see Table 1) is a list of corrective actions and 
failure resolutions.  Recommendations could include, in the order of priority: 
1)  Design solutions to eliminate the failure mode or reduce its likelihood, 
including: functional redundancies and error proofing the assembly, 
installation and usage.   
2)  Actions to reduce the severity of the failure mode in terms of its impact on 
the user, performance, and other systems 
3)  Developing means of detecting causes of failure modes during 
manufacturing including:  inspection, testing, and error proofing.   
4)  Tests to provide more information data to assess Probability and Severity 
5)  Providing diagnostics to easily identify the failure mode or cause during 
manufacturing or operation.   
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6)  Establish periodic maintenance or check-ups to enhance availability 
and safety.   
 
3. Concept of Life Cost Based FMEA 
 
Lifecycle cost is the total monetary cost of ownership of a product during the 
lifetime of its use.  This includes acquisition cost, marketing, cost of ownership 
(repair, scheduled maintenance, and usage costs), and sometimes retirement cost 
of the product.  Acquisition cost is relatively well perceived and defined in 
industry.  However, cost of ownership is overlooked most of the time during the 
design stage.  Repair and scheduled maintenance costs are hard to predict and no 
formal set of tools exist to make predictions.  Life Cost Based FMEA is a tool 
developed to predict unexpected failure costs and ultimately compare lifecycle 
cost between different designs. 
 
From Equation 1, expected failure cost is the sum of all possible failures with 
respect to their probability and cost of failure.  Probability of failure can be 
determined from field data, test data, or empirical data.  Cost of failure can be 
measured in terms of time as will be discussed in the following and hardware cost. 
 
3.1. Cost 
 
Failures may occur at any stage of the life cycle and can be detected either during the 
same stage or during subsequent stages.   The failure cost is smallest when the origin 
and detection occur during the same stage.  The failure cost increases as the origin 
and detection stages become further apart. 
 
The example shown in Figure 2 is where a failure is detected during the operations 
stage and the initial origin of the failure is a design error.  Due to design error, the part 
has to be redesigned, remanufactured, and reinstalled. There may be some delay 
between each of these activities also.  Recovery time is the whole time the system is 
inoperable due to the failure.  Recovery time is associated with lost opportunity.   
 
Figure 2 shows the four possible failure initiating stages and the failure detection 
stages. 
 
? Failure origin indicates when the failure has been initially introduced. The 
four possible stages are: Design, Manufacture, Installation, and Operation. 
 
?  Detection phase indicates the stage at which the failure has been realized.  
The four possible stages are: Design Review, Inspection, Testing, and 
Operation. 
 
Time is the basic unit used to convert failure consequence into cost.  Detection time, 
fixing time, delay time and loss time are the four fundamental time penalties in this 
analysis. 
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Figure 2.  Initial Origin and Detection Stages of Failure 
 
 
? Detection Time: Time to realize and identify a certain type of failure that has 
occurred and diagnose the exact location and its root cause. 
 
? Fixing Time: Time to fix each individual component.  Redesign, 
remanufacturing, and reinstallation are some examples of activities that lead 
to fixing time. 
 
? Delay Time:  Time incurred for a non-value activity such as waiting for 
technicians to respond, set up time, and mailing/shipping time.  
 
? Loss Time:  Time during which the system has been shut down and has not 
produced any value.  Only applies to failures that happen during the 
operations stage.  Loss time is the sum of Detection time, Fixing time, and 
Delay time.  Loss time is used to calculate the opportunity cost of failure. 
 
Table 5 shows a Life Cost-Based FMEA table that is filled-in for this methodology.  
The “Outputs” in this table are the 3 main components of Failure cost: labor cost, 
parts cost, and opportunity cost.   Labor and opportunity costs are dependent on time 
and parts cost is dependent on material cost. Units for time penalties are in hours.   
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Table 5. Life Cost Based FMEA Table 
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Too many loads on circuit Magnet turned off Oper Oper 30 0.001 0.5 4 0 5 1 50 180        15      112,500 
Water passage is blocked Magnet turned off Oper Oper 30 2 1 4 0 5 1 50 38,400   3,000 125,000 
Damaged coil Magnet turned off Inst TR 1 4 0.5 2 0 3 1 1250 1,280     5,000 62,500   
Water sprayed on to coil Magnet turned off Oper Oper 30 3 2 8 0 10 1 50 115,200 4,500 250,000 
OutputInput
Thermal swtich trip due to overheating
Root Cause of Failure Effect of FailureFailure Mode
 
 
 
• Origin indicates the stage at which the root cause of the failure lies in Figure 1. 
 
• Detection indicates the stage at which the failure has occurred and been 
identified. 
 
• Re-occurring indicates whether the failure is a one time event or could reoccur 
during the life time of the system.  Failures that have root causes in design, 
manufacturing, or installation stages are usually one time errors and “1” is 
prescribed in this column.  Failures that have root causes in assembly and 
operation stages are most likely to have random failures throughout the lifetime of 
the system. This lifetime is 30 years for the magnets in the International Linear 
Collider (ILC) which we are using as an example.  Thus, “30” is prescribed in 
Table 6 under this column for failures that originate during the operation stage.  
 
• Frequency indicates how often the failure occurs.  Failures that originate in 
design, manufacturing, or assembly are assumed to be one time event failures and 
the probability of occurrence is assigned to the frequency variable.  Failures that 
originate in assembly or operations reoccur during the life time of the system, thus 
frequency of failure during a one year period is assigned to this variable.  
Frequency will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.2. 
 
• Quantity indicates the total number of components/systems affected by the 
failure. It describes whether a failure affects an individual component, a batch, a 
sector, or the entire system.  “1” is assigned to isolated failures that happen 
randomly.  Manufacturing failures may affect a whole batch of parts that are 
going through the manufacturing process together, resulting in scrapping the 
entire batch and re-manufacturing.  A manufacturing failure detected during the 
installation stage would require all of the components to be replaced.  An event 
such as an earthquake may affect magnets in a whole accelerator region or just a 
couple of sectors, depending on the earthquake magnitude.  
 
• Parts Cost is the actual material cost to fix the failure if it is done through parts 
replacement. If the failure is a water hose leak and the hose needs to be replaced, 
the actual cost of the hose, $50, is taken as the value of the parts cost.   
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3.1.1. Labor Costs 
Labor cost can be derived with the time information input in the cost-based FMEA 
table using the following equation:  
}Operators] of #  rateLabor   TimeDelay [
 Quantity]  Operators of #  rateLabor   Time Fixing [
  Operators] of #  rateLabor   TimeDetection {[OccurrenceCostLabor 
××
+×××
+×××=
 
A typical Labor rate used for this analysis is $75/hour for the operators.  
 
Assumption:  Operators work in pairs when they enter the tunnel to diagnose and to 
fix the problems. 
 
3.1.2. Material Costs 
 
Component replacement due to failure is considered as material cost.  Material cost is 
obtained using the following equation: 
       
Part  ofCost     replace  toparts ofQuantity  OccurrenceCost  Material ××=
 
 
3.1.2.1. Corrector Magnets 
 
Parts cost to replace corrector magnets and their components are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 Parts Cost for Corrector Magnets 
 
 Part Min Mean Max 
Solid wire Coil $250 $400 $1000 
Core $200 $750 $2000 
Whole Corrector $750 $2000 $4000 
 
 
 
3.1.2.2. Water cooled Magnets 
 
Parts cost to replace water cooled electromagnets and their components are shown in 
Table 7. These were typical costs for medium sized magnets in ~2002. 
 
Table 7 Parts Cost for Water Cooled Magnets 
 
 Part Min Mean Max 
Hollow Cu Coil $500 $1500 $4000 
Core $1250 $3500 $20,000 
Whole Magnet $4000 $11,000 $30,000 
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The average cost to replace circuit boards for a magnet power supply is $500.  This 
includes the cost of the manual labor to fix the boards and the cost to replace 
necessary components on the board.  
 
3.1.3. Opportunity Cost 
 
Opportunity cost is the cost that incurs when a failure inhibits the main function of 
the system and prevents any value creation. In a particle collider this would be the 
inability to generate particle collisions and hence no data for the experimental particle 
physicists.  Opportunity cost is calculated using the following equation:  
  
Opportunity Cost = Loss Time x Hourly Opportunity Cost         (4) 
where, 
Loss Time = {Detection Time + Fixing Time + Delay Time}      
 
The setting of the hourly opportunity cost might be easier to understand if one thinks 
of losing the opportunity to create particle collisions while broken device is repaired.  
Think about a case where staff is sitting idle while the accelerator has no beam.  The 
power sources will not be turned off for repairs taking a few hours, so the electricity 
bill will be the same as if the beams were there.  A third consideration is the value of 
the whole facility; some experts argue that the capital cost of the accelerator should 
be included in the hourly opportunity cost.  In which case you amortize the several 
billion dollar construction cost over the total number of required operating hours in a 
30 year operating life. 
 
As you will see from the example costs for the ILC (if it had been built in about 2002) 
given below there can be large differences between the 3 opportunity costs evaluated 
in 3 different ways.  But note that even the lowest hourly opportunity cost is order of 
magnitude higher than the hourly labor rate for the repair technicians.  Three different 
numbers are used in this analysis:    
  
 $10,000/hour: Only direct labor is considered (Technicians, Physicists and Staff) 
$25,000/hour: Direct labor + electricity that is consumed by the ILC during 
shutdown.  
$50,000/hour: Direct labor + Electricity + Depreciation of the ILC ($6B) over 30 
year period.  
3.2. Frequency and Probability 
 
Frequency is either the number of failure events or the probability for a specific 
failure to happen during a given period of time.  A frequency value of “0.1”, for a 
design related failure means that there is a 10% chance a mistake will occur during 
the design process.   Thus, it is not possible to have a frequency value greater than 
“1” for failures that have root causes that trace back to design, manufacturing, and 
assembly stages.  Failures that have root causes in assembly and operations will have 
values of any real number in the frequency column. 
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Frequency values can be obtained from observing historical data of failure devices 
with similar designs used under similar environmental conditions.  At SLAC we have 
17 years worth of data on component failures in the various beamlines stored in 2 
computer databases called CATER and ARTEMIS. Data from the CATER system 
can be used to predict failures modes and their probability for most component 
designs for the ILC.   
 
What if data does not exist for a certain design in the current system?  Reliability of 
components/system has to be modeled using different failure distributions or test data.  
The most common distributions used for failure analysis are Weibull distribution for 
fatigue related failures and exponential distribution for electronics and probabilistic 
modeling.  A detailed description of predicting failure frequency is given in the next 
section. 
 
 
4. Availability/Reliability Predictions 
 
Mission-critical products and complex systems like particle collider require engineers 
to estimate the reliability of critical components and systems before they are built.  In 
many cases, engineers rely on test data, published data, or field data to predict 
reliability.    Reliability is defined as the probability of a device performing its 
purpose adequately for an intended period of time.  The basic parameter to measure 
reliability is known as the failure rate.   General expression for failure rate is 
expressed as the ratio of total number of failures to the total operating time which can 
be expressed as follows: 
 
T
KRateFailure =)(λ       (5) 
 
where K is the number of failures and T is the total operating time. 
 
The base model to predict the overall reliability of a single component, taking into 
account all operating conditions, has the generic form: 
 
  ECSRATbp ππππππλλ ⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅=      (6) 
 
where λp is the part failure rate, λb is the base failure rate at some fixed operating 
conditions, πT temperature modification factor, πA application factor, πR power 
modification factor,   πS electrical stress factor,  πC construction factor,   and πE 
environmental modification factor. 
 
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) 
MTBF is the average time between maintenances. MTBF value is the ratio of total 
operating time to the total number of failures.  It can be expressed by taking the 
reciprocal of the failure rate as: 
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   λ
1
==
K
TMTBF       (7) 
 
Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) 
MTTR is the statistical mean or average of the distribution time to repair. MTTR 
value is calculated by taking the cumulative totals of repair time over a specific 
period and dividing it by the total number of incidents.  Mathematically it is 
expressed as: 
   ∑
=
=
n
i
i
n
T
MTTR
1
       (8) 
where, n= number of incidents and T is the time to repair the i th incident. 
 
Availability is the probability that a system will operate to satisfactory conditions at 
any given time.  Availability is the ratio between Uptime and Total Scheduled 
operating hours. It can be expressed as: 
  
MTTRMTBF
MTBF
HoursOperatingScheduled
UptimeAtyAvailabili
+
==)(  (9) 
 
 
Field failures do not generally occur at a uniform rate, but follow a distribution in 
time commonly described as a "bathtub curve."  The reliability bathtub curve is a 
conceptual model that is used to describe reliability at a component level over its life 
cycle.  The bathtub consists of three stages as shown in Figure 3.  Not all products 
follow the bath tub curve model but most do. 
   
    
Figure 3. Reliability Bathtub Curve 
 
The three phases are:  
 
1. Infant Mortality Phase:  The early life period of device operation is 
characterized by a rapidly declining failure rate. It occurs between 0 and 
10,000 hours (~1 year) of device operation. Quality control defects due to 
poor workmanship, contamination, and other substandard manufacturing 
practice are liable for failures at this stage. Examples include premature 
failure due to poor manufacturing or assembly errors, use of poor quality 
material, etc.  This has led to the development of burn-in procedures to 
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eliminate infant mortality rate. The failure rate during the early life period can 
be modeled by the Weibull Distribution (Ebeling, 1997).  
 
2. Useful Life Phase: Beyond the infant mortality period, in the useful life 
period, the failure rate is assumed to be following an exponential distribution. 
The failure rate in this phase is at its lowest and is relatively constant. It 
begins after 10,000 hours (~1 year) of device operation.  Failures during this 
stage are due to random or normal wear and tear where failures are caused by 
unexpected or sudden over stress conditions.  This is where intelligent 
engineering can keep the failure rate at a negligible level. 
  
3. Wearout Phase: Failures during this phase are due to component aging. 
Examples of what causes aging include fatigue, corrosion, creep, and other 
aging phenomena. Failures during this phase do not occur randomly. 
 
Engineering work is done at the design stage to reduce or eliminate failures during the 
Useful Life and Wearout phases.  FMEA allows us to identify failures in these stages 
for a particular design and to analyze how frequently these failures might occur, this 
will aid in increasing the reliability of the product.  Three different approaches are 
discussed to predict the frequency of failures: Using empirical data, failure 
distribution estimation, and a mixture of both. 
 
Step 1 Determine the new component or system that needs to be analyzed 
Step 2 Identify if such a component or system exists in the current system (SLC) 
 If a similar or the same component exists in the current system follow section 
(4.1) Empirical data.  If it is a brand new design then follow section (4.2) 
Distribution estimate.  If some component of the total system is currently in 
use then follow (4.3) Mixture of Data. 
Step 3 Categorize the components or systems into different sizes, capacities, and 
features for the failure rate analysis.  
 
4.1. Empirical Data 
 
Many of the components designed for the ILC are very similar to designs in the SLC 
and PEP II SLAC used the Computer Aided Trouble Reporting (CATER) system from 
1988 to 2003 and now is using Accelerator Remedy Trouble Entry and Maintenance 
Information System (ARTEMIS) to keep track of all component failures in the all the 
beamlines.  Since we are interested in predicting the availability of the new system, 
only failures that actually brought down the accelerator will be considered as a failure 
data point in the analysis.  A lot of information is captured in the CATER + 
ARTEMIS database system and only the following data points are needed to conduct 
an availability and frequency analysis: assumptions  
 
1. Date and Time of report 
The date enables us to ascertain beam lines were running when the failure 
occurred. Knowing the beamlines that were operational at that moment gives 
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us how many components were working. This information is used to analyze 
the type of failures in chronological order.  The start time of the failure is 
required to determine how long it took to detect the failure, how long it took 
to fix, and to see if there were any delays. 
2. Beam Time Loss 
This information tells us how long the accelerator was shutdown due to this 
failure.  This value should be equal to the sum of detection time, fixing time 
and delay time. We are interested in failures that actually forced the 
accelerator to shutdown. 
3. Failure component 
This information tells us which component has failed.  You may have to work 
out the type of component to put it in the correct category.  
4. Location of failure 
This information tells us where the failed component resides along the beam 
lines.  It indicates if the failed component was in the LINAC, North Damping 
ring, South Damping ring, HER, LER, and etc.  
5. Observation 
The technician who gets to the scene of the failure reports what is observed 
when they arrive.  It is entered into the CATER/ARTEMIS by the main 
control operator. 
6. Action taken 
This information describes what the technicians have done to fix the problem.  
There are no categories in the trouble report systems for entering the root 
cause of failure.  Thus, it is the FMEA team’s responsibility to interpret the 
root cause of failure from Action taken and Observation descriptions. 
7. Date and time of finished repair 
This information helps us interpret how long the repair took and how long the 
beam line was shut down for. 
 
Once these pieces of information are gathered from the CATER or ARTEMIS system 
and analyzed a few other pieces of information need to be gathered to carry out the 
reliability analysis as follows: 
 
1. Determine the time period to investigate in the CATER system 
From a statistical point of view, 30 data points are said to be the minimum 
number to do any statistical analysis.  Obviously we are able to make better 
predictions if there are more data points.  However, analyzing hundreds of 
data entries may take a long time.  We recommend observing a period that 
contains more than 50 data entries (failures) and several different types of 
beamlines.  A 5 year period is recommended for the initial investigation. 
 
2. Beamline running schedule 
The beam line configuration changes overtime and the number of components 
change with respect to the configuration.  Thus, we need to know which 
beamlines were running during the investigation period and how many hours 
it was suppose to run (Runtime). 
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3. Number of components in each beam line 
In order to count the number of components in each previously specified 
category, the FMEA team will have to consult with drawings and lattices of 
the beamlines. 
 
4.  Number of components in the ILC 
To predict the frequency of failure for the ILC we need to know how many 
components of the same categories there will be in the ILC. 
 
Step 4. Fill out the Availability table as shown in Table 8 for each type of component 
in a separate table.  Within the table each row corresponds to a particular 
beamline’s running period. 
 
 Beam line, operation hours (Run hours), and number of components in the beam 
line are all found in the previous steps. 
 
• Component hours is the product of Run Hours and # of Components in 
the listed beamline.  This is a parameter created to calculate the average 
availability of a single component at SLAC. 
• # of failures indicates the number of component failures that occurred 
during that operation period as found by searching the CATER/AREMIS 
databases. 
• MTBF is calculated by dividing Component hours by the # of failures 
during that period.  The unit is in hours. 
• TR is the total repair time for all of the failures during that period. This is 
the sum of beam loss time for that period. The unit is in hours. 
• MTTR is total repair time (TR) divided by the number of failures for that 
period. The unit is in hours. 
• Availability is calculated using Equation 6. This calculation yields the 
empirical availability for one component of certain type at SLAC. 
 
Table 8. Availability Table 
 
Date Beam 
Line 
Run 
Hours 
# of 
Components 
Component 
Hours 
#  of 
Failures 
MTBF 
(hr) 
TR 
(hr) 
MTTR 
(hr) 
Availability 
5/1/97 
~ 
6/8/98 
SLC 8828 2300 20,304,400 15 1,353,626 136 9.06 0.999771 
 
 
Step 5 Calculate Availability for the entire system 
 
The average availability of a single magnet can be calculated by adding the total 
Component Hours and MTBF for the entire year period.  Most of the components 
in the ILC are run in series without redundancy.  Thus, if one fails, the whole 
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system will shut down.  First, we will consider systems that are not redundant and 
then consider systems that are in redundant. 
 
a. No Redundancy in System 
 
We can estimate the availability of a system that has components in series 
using the following equation: 
 
A Sys = (A single component)n                      (10) 
 
Where A is availability and n is the total number of components in the system. 
 
b. Redundancy in system 
 
If the component has low reliability but the system requires a high availability, 
a redundant system is one solution to achieve the requirement.  The engineer 
has to evaluate if it’s more cost effective to design and build a high reliability 
component or to build a redundant system.   
 
Standby Reliability Model 
When identical components are in parallel and in a standby mode, only one 
component is activated at a time.  If the active component fails the other 
component hooked up in parallel is switched on.  The overall reliability is 
calculated as a two-part configuration: the reliability of the first component 
and the reliability of the second part, after the first part fails.  Thus, the 
calculation becomes the unreliability of the first component multiplied by the 
reliability of the second part after the first part fails if we assume perfect 
switching. For components in parallel, we use the following equation to 
calculate MTBF: 
  MTBFSet = ∑
=
n
i i1
1
λ       (11) 
 
where n is the number of identical component in parallel and λ is the failure 
rate of one component.  Thus, for two identical components in parallel 
redundancy the expected MTBF of the set becomes 2/ λ.   For example, if the 
MTBF of a motor is 50,000 hours, a redundant system with two identical 
motors will yield a MTBF of 100,000 hours. 
 
Standby Reliability with Repair 
For identical components that are in parallel and one is repaired without 
interrupting the system, the following reliability equation is used to calculate 
the set. 
  
 k1 = λ1+ λ2+r 
 k2 = λ1 λ2 
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λ is the failure rate of the component, R is the reliability, t is 6480 hours 
which is the operation time for a one year period (Eberling, 1997). 
 
Knowing the MTBF for the redundant set of components, availability of the 
redundant set can be calculated and the overall system availability can be 
calculated using Equation 10 and paying attention to the number of 
components in the system.  
 
Step 6 Calculate MTBF and Downtime 
 
Knowing the availability of the entire system, the MTBF for the entire system can 
be calculated using Equation 7.  The expected operating hours for the ILC is 6480 
hours/year.   Thus, the downtime of the accelerator can be predicted using the 
following equation: 
  
  Downtime = (1-Availability) x 6480 hours 
 
Step 7 Calculate Frequency 
 
Knowing downtime and the MTTR for the system, failure frequency per year can 
be calculated using the following equation: 
 
  Frequency (Failure/year) = 
MTTR
Downtime
 
 
To predict specific types of failures as defined in the FMEA table, one can follow 
steps 4 through 7 for each individual failure modes or root causes.  It is critical to 
find the root cause of each failure from the CATER system to conduct this 
analysis. This further analysis will result in creating several versions of table 6.   
 
4.2. Reliability Estimation from Distributions 
 
When a new design is being introduced and no field data exists, we have to rely 
on manufacturer’s reliability data or use time-to-failure distributions.  The most 
popular failure distributions are the Weibull, normal, and exponential 
distributions.   
 
The normal distribution is frequently used to model quality related characteristics 
and sampling measures.  It is widely used for process behaviors for quality control 
purposes. It is symmetrical and has a single mode.  Despite its popularity it is 
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probably the most overused and incorrectly used distribution (Wasserman, 2003).  
In the real world, processes are noisy and do not conform to a nice bell shape 
curve.  It also has infinite tails at both ends.  Since ILC failures are not process 
oriented failures, we will not use the normal distribution. 
 
4.2.1. Exponential distribution 
The exponential distribution is widely used in electronics and probabilistic 
modeling.  It is applicable for modeling constant failure-rate phenomena.   
 
  R(t) = e-λt 
 
The unique property of the exponential distribution is: 
 
  ∫∞ == 0 1)( λtRMTTF  
 
The exponential distribution is widely used for modeling time-to-failure of 
electronic components.  It is also widely used to model failure at the system level.  
Component manufacturers usually specify the MTTF for their component and this 
value can be used to model the overall MTTF of the system. 
 
When multiple components are in series and if one fails the whole system shuts 
down, the MTBF of the overall system uses the following equation: 
 
  ∑
=
=
n
i i
MTBF
1
1
λ         (13) 
 
where n is the number of components in the system.  Thus, for n components of 
identical failure rate λ, the expected MTBF = n/λ.  
 
 
 
4.2.2 Weibull distribution 
Weibull is a distribution that can be modeled for a wide range of phenomena.  The 
Weibull distribution is expressed in the form of: 
 
1)()( −= β
θθ
βλ tt  
 
Where λ is decreasing with time for β<1; it is increasing with time for β>1; and β 
=1 corresponds to a constant failure-rate.  β is the shape factor and θ  is the mean 
time to failure.  The three parameter Weibull distribution is used to model 
phenomena that take a shortest time to evolve, such as failures due to fatigue, 
corrosion, creep, and other degradation phenomena.   
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Weibull analysis is extensively used to study mechanical, chemical, electrical, 
electronic, material, and human failures. The primary advantages of the Weibull 
analysis are its abilities to: 
• Provide moderately accurate failure analysis and failure forecasts with 
extremely small data samples, making solutions possible at the earliest 
indications of a problem.  
• Provide simple and useful graphical plots for individual failure modes that can 
be easily interpreted and understood, even when data inadequacies exist.  
• Represent a broad range of distribution shapes so that the distribution with the 
best fit can be selected.  
• Provide physics-of-failure clues based on the slope of the Weibull probability 
plot.  
Although the use of the normal or lognormal distribution generally requires at 
least 20 failures or knowledge from prior experience, Weibull analysis works 
extremely well when there are as few as 2 or 3 failures, which is critical when the 
result of a failure involves safety or extreme costs. Parameters for the Weibull 
distribution for most components can be found in many references 
(http://www.barringer1.com/wdbase.htm).  
Using distribution systems to model the MTBF in Excel will be discussed in the 
following section, Monte Carlo Simulation. 
4.3. Mixture of Data 
 
A system is most likely to be assembled with many components or subsystems.  
In order to predict an accurate overall MTBF, components operated under similar 
environmental conditions to the new system whenever possible.  This means some 
subsystem may have empirical data and some may not. Using equation 12, we can 
predict the MTBF for any given system with data that from a combination of 
empirical data, manufacturer’s test data, and Weibull failure distribution. 
Modification factors in equation 6 are based upon testing and historical data.  If the 
values are unknown, “1” will be used as the modification variable. 
 
 
5. Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
Life Cost-Based FMEA as described up till now uses point estimation for its analysis.  
The danger with using point estimation is the potential for misinterpretation of the 
average numbers.  Strategy based on average conditions can be false since one does not 
know if the condition has reached the upper or lower thresholds. A sensitivity analysis on 
the estimates will provide better confidence in the result and make for a better 
understanding of which variables are the cost drivers.  
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5.1 Modeling Time 
 
A Monte Carlo simulation is applied to the Life Cost-Based FMEA to perform a 
sensitivity analysis on the variables associated to failure cost: detection time, fixing time, 
delay time, quantity, and parts cost.  An example of a triangular distribution with 
minimum fixing time of 1.2 hours, mode of 2.5 hours and max value of 4.5 hours is 
shown in Figure 4. A triangular distribution using minimum, mode, and maximum value 
was used.  There are many distribution systems one can use for the simulation; however, 
with limited past history data and using estimated variables, a triangular distribution was 
selected. There are several commercial software programs for applying a Monte Carlo 
simulation; we have used Crystal Ball v2000.2 in our analysis.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Triangular Distribution (Min: 1.2, Mode: 2.5, Max: 4.5) 
 
For each time category, the users must decide what the minimum, mode, and 
maximum values will be.  These values are acquired using empirical data or expert 
opinion. The steps to applying Monte Carlo simulation in the Crystal Ball software are as 
follows: 
 
1. Move the cursor to the cell that requires a distribution analysis 
2. Select “Define Assumption” icon on the menu bar 
3. From the popup window, select “Triangular Distribution” and click “OK” button. 
4. Input the 3 values : Min, Likeliest, Max 
5. Repeat steps 1 through 4 for all unknown variables. 
6. Move the cursor to the cell that sums up the total cost 
7. Select “Define Forecast” button on the main menu 
8. Type in Forecast Name (e.g. “Labor Cost”) 
9. Go to the menu bar and under “Run” select “Run Preferences” 
10. Type “5000” under maximum number of trials and select “OK” button. 
11. Select “Run” under the run menu bar. 
12. Several popup windows should appear that correspond to the forecast name that 
was specified in step 8. (Figure 5) 
 
Fixing Time
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Figure 5. Distribution of Opportunity Cost 
 
 
13. Sensitivity analysis on each forecast can be made through sliding the triangle icon 
on underneath the distribution curve and reading the certainty level.  More detail 
on how to interpret these graphs will be given in section 6. 
 
 
 
5.2 Modeling MTBF using Weibull distribution 
 
For components or subsystems where empirical data does not exist, MTBF can be 
modeled using Crystal Ball.   
 
1. Move the cursor to the cell that requires a Weibull distribution analysis and type 
in the typical MTBF for that particular component 
2. Select “Define Assumption” icon from the menu bar 
3. From the popup window, select “Weibull Distribution” and click “OK” button. 
4. Type in the location, scale, and shape factors from the table  
5. Move the cursor to the cell that sums up the total cost 
6. Select “Define Forecast” button on the main menu 
7. Type in Forecast Name (e.g. “Labor Cost”) 
8. Go to the menu bar and under “Run” select “Run Preferences” 
9. Type “5000” under maximum number of trials and select “OK” button. 
10. Select “Run” under the run menu bar. 
11. Several popup windows should appear that correspond to the forecast name that 
was specified in step 8. 
 
5.3. Modeling Parts Cost 
 Material cost which is a product of parts cost and quantity affected can be 
simulated using the steps in 5.1 and 5.2. Triangular distribution for cost of parts and 
quantity are used. 
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6. How to Interpret and Use Results 
 
The failure cost for each failure scenario will be calculated on each row of the Lifecycle 
Cost based FMEA sheet (Table 5).  Labor cost and Material cost are the expected direct 
cost for the failures.  Opportunity cost does not incur an extra cost to run the ILC but it is 
expenses lost due to the collider not operating.  The failure cost is also plotted after 
running the Monte Carlo simulation (Figure 5) 
You should consider mitigating the high failure costs (sum of labor and material costs) 
through 3 different strategic abatements: 
 
6.1 Higher reliability  
 
This approach is taken for failures that have high frequency.  If it is a component failure, 
you should consider using a component with a higher MTBF or making the system 
redundant to achieve an overall higher reliability.  You will need to conduct a lifecycle 
cost analysis to compare the two different possibilities and conduct trade-off analysis. 
 
6.2 Design for serviceability 
 
This approach tries to reduce the downtime of the collider and reduce the fixing time. 
You may consider relocating components or sub-systems with higher failure frequency to 
a location that is more accessible once the cover is opened up.  Designing special tools or 
jigs to make the components more serviceable is another possibility. 
 
6.3 Design diagnostic capability 
 
This approach can be effective for failures that can be predicted with an early detection 
system.  Sensors are quite affordable these days and alerting the user ahead of the actual 
failure can be quite economical for cases where higher reliability is not feasible.  Printers 
for example alert the user the toner is low 500 pages before it stops printing.  Thus, the 
user has ample time to order a new set of toner and replace it before the printer becomes 
inoperable. 
 
6.4 Examples of Regular FMEA and Life Cost-Based FMEA 
 
Spencer took part in a regular FMEA process on a water-cooled electromagnet for a 
particle accelerator (Bellomo, 2000; Rago, 2002). Both authors developed the life cost-
based FMEA using systems of electromagnets and permanent magnets (Rhee, 2003; Rhee, 
2004).  
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